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1. Introduction 
1 The literature dealing with corruption has typically based its analysis on a principal–
agent  model  of  decision-making,  which assumes corruption happens as  the result  of
flawed incentives on the part of the agent and weak monitoring capacity of the principal
(Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Policy solutions based on this conceptualisation
prescribe  measures  such  as  a  tougher  criminalisation  of  corruption  and  stronger
monitoring mechanisms in the public sector. The lack of success of conventional anti-
corruption  measures  in  many  countries,  including  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  has
subsequently  led  other  scholars  to  conceptualise  corruption  as  a  collective  action
problem , which although providing a compelling framework to explain the unyielding
persistence of  high levels  of  corruption has nonetheless failed to provide alternative
policy solutions. While the conceptual debate on this topic continues (Heywood, 2017;
Mungiu-Pippidi,  2017),  a  growing  consensus  points  to  the  need  to  collect  empirical
evidence in order to better understand the practices underpinning corruption, which
evidently persist despite structural and institutional reform (Baez-Camargo and Passas,
2017). 
2 Regarding African countries, the lack of a context-sensitive approach to anti-corruption
measures is not due to a lack of data. In fact, a vast body of literature on Africa has
illustrated  extensively  particular  features  characterising  African  political  regimes
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(Bayart,  1993;  Bratton  and  Van  de  Walle,  1994;  Chabal  and  Daloz,  1999)  as  well  as
particular social norms and practices among citizens that in one way or the other are
associated  with  the  prevalence  of  high levels  of  corruption (Hyden,  1980;  Olivier  de
Sardan, 1999; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006). It would therefore be useful to work
towards developing better systematic approaches linking the evidence on local drivers of
corruption  to  the  wider  debate  on  anti-corruption.  Such  approaches  should  avoid  a
purely  relativistic  perspective  while  ensuring  that  generalizable  dimensions  are  well
specified and allow for contextual variation. 
3 Relevant  questions  to  be  asked  include:  How are  the  decisions  and practices  of  key
national  and subnational  actors shaped? What are the practices that  individuals  find
useful  in  addressing  their  problems  and  needs?  What  are  the  networks  linking  up
different actors, and how are they articulated? How do these networks and their practices
underpin corruption? 
4 In this chapter we present empirical evidence1 aimed at identifying those practices and
norms that inform the agency of local actors,  whether they be political and business
elites,  bureaucrats and providers of  public services,  or normal citizens,  in three East
African countries: Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
5 In the analysis of the empirical evidence from the case study countries we favour an
approach to the characterisation of  local  governance processes  that  moves attention
away from conventional categories and dichotomies (such as state vs. non-state actors,
public vs. private, or sector-based assessments), shifting our analytical attention to the
socially grounded practices that transcend the public sector. 2 That notwithstanding, we
make use of the term ‘informal governance’ because, although it reproduces dichotomies
that are empirically and conceptually debatable,  it connects closely to the manner in
which corruption is problematised among international development practitioners, who
constitute a key audience for our research. In this sense, our use of ‘informal’ does not
imply  a  fundamental  divide  between  different  spheres,  but  signifies  the  wide  and
contingent range of repertoires that actors have at their disposal, which transcend and
straddle essentialist distinctions between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’. 
6 In this chapter, we build on the evidence emerging from the ongoing research projects,
discussing data collected from focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews conducted
across the three countries—namely, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.3 The data strongly
indicates the importance of social networks linking up actors that shape and are shaped
by particular patterns of informal governance. Thus, social networks emerged inductively
as heuristic entry points for a better understanding of prevalent practices and norms as
well  as  lines  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  of  actors.4 Throughout  the  chapter  we  pay
particular attention to the role of social networks as articulations through which social
norms are enacted and reiterated. Through this analytical lens we seek to gain a better
understanding of ‘real’ governance processes5 and the ways in which they underpin or
reproduce corruption. 
7 The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides general background information
about the prevailing conditions across the three countries with regard to the fight against
corruption.  Section  3  outlines  the  conceptual  approach  used  for  uncovering  locally
determined drivers of corruption and the general traits characterising social networks in
the three countries. Next, we describe how networks utilise the practices of co-optation
(Section 4), control (Section 5) and camouflage (Section 6). Finally, in Section 7 we reflect
on the implications of our findings.
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 2. Background Information on Corruption in Rwanda,
Tanzania and Uganda
8 East Africa presents excellent opportunities to explore what may be important factors
impinging on the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Regional trends point to sharp
differences in performance that are reflected in the three cases included in our research. 
9 At one extreme, Uganda represents a modal pattern in the region, involving endemic
corruption in spite of extensive reforms and anti-corruption interventions implemented
by  the  government  of  President  Yoweri  Museveni.  Instances  of  bribery,  favouritism,
absenteeism and gift-giving are widespread,  with significant negative impacts on the
provision of  basic public  services.  The situation is  confirmed by research findings in
which Ugandan participants corroborate the perception that corruption is rampant and
has become a normalised feature of daily life.
10 In Rwanda, the government led by President Paul Kagame is considered to have achieved
significant success in controlling corruption by means of radical public sector reform,
enforcement of traditional accountability mechanisms, and the introduction of locally
designed  governance  tools  (Golooba-Mutebi  and  Booth,  2013;  Bozzini,  2014).  Strong
political  commitment  is  operationalised  in  a  ‘zero-tolerance’  approach  to  corruption
based on harsh punishments and their strict enforcement, coupled with mass campaigns
sensitising the public about the value of anti-corruption measures and integrity, which
have resulted in Rwanda being categorised among the least corrupt countries in Africa. 
11 In the case of Tanzania, high levels of corruption have pervaded all aspects of public
administration for decades, becoming a constant feature in the experience of citizens in
their  interactions  with  the  state,  especially  when it  comes  to  the  delivery  of  public
services.  However,  since  the  2015  election,  the  government  led  by  President  John
Magufuli has vowed to renew anti-corruption efforts, and has taken significantly bold
actions  to  punish  and  prevent  illicit  behaviours.  Although  some  of  the  measures
undertaken by the current  administration have generated national  and international
criticism on the grounds of being perceived as detrimental to essential democratic rights
and civil liberties, it is nonetheless remarkable that President Magufuli’s promise to fight
corruption has received overwhelming support from Tanzanian citizens.6
12 These three distinct anti-corruption outcomes are consistent with the recent East African
Bribery Index (EABI), which found that 81 per cent of respondents in Uganda describe the
level  of  corruption  in  their  country  as  high,  whereas  in  Tanzania  44  per  cent  of
respondents describe levels  of  corruption in their  country as  medium.  A majority of
Rwandan  respondents—61  per  cent—describe  corruption  in  their  country  as  low.
Furthermore, the EABI also indicates that Ugandans share a grim assessment of past and
future performance, as 59 per cent of respondents believe that corruption has increased
in comparison to the previous year and will continue to increase during the following 12
months. In contrast, a positive outlook was shared among a majority of Tanzanian and
Rwandan  respondents  (70  per  cent  and  61  per  cent,  respectively),  who  believe  that
corruption has  decreased  in  comparison  to  the  previous  year  and  will  continue  to
decrease in the subsequent  12 months (70 per  cent  of  respondents  in each country)
(Transparency International, 2017).
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3. Conceptual Approach to Social Networks: Solidarity,
Lock-in and Protection
13 Research findings from the three countries confirm a vast body of literature regarding
the  role  of  social  networks  in  East  Africa  and  beyond:  strong  personal  connections
constitute an effective mechanism with which to pool scarce resources and provide access
to  goods,  services,  resources  and  even  career  opportunities  in  contexts  of  resource
scarcity  and weak state  performance (Jauregui,  2014;  Ruud,  2000;  Chang et  al.,  2001;
Grodeland et  al.,  1998;  Ledeneva,  1997;  Sneath,  2002).  The findings  concerning social
networks deserve to be further emphasised in the context of the present chapter because
they  provide  valuable  insights  about  local  social  practices  that  are  linked  to  the
prevalence of corruption but are nevertheless not normally taken into consideration in
conventional anti-corruption programming. 
14 Whereas it is clear that individuals belong to multiple, overlapping networks anywhere,
the type of networks that are most relevant for this research are those to which the
individual feels bound by obligations that are enforced and sanctioned by stringent social
controls. Such networks are the social equivalent of what political science refers to as the
leader’s ‘winning coalition’ (Mesquita et al., 2005), meaning those constituencies whose
support  is  most  essential  for  maintaining  support  and legitimacy  in  the  case  of  the
political leader, and status and social recognition within the community in the case of the
individual. They are the core networks, or reference groups (Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-
Patel, 2017), in which strict social norms are enforced and the individuals feel obliged to
satisfy the expectations of the group.
15 Indeed, our data shows how informal social networks generate strong moral imperatives,
including a sense of obligation to provide mutual assistance and reciprocity for favours
given,  which  go above  and  beyond  any  respect  for  the  formal  legal  framework.
Individuals are thus expected to share with their next of kin, who in turn feel strongly
entitled to a share of the wealth. Obligations vis-à-vis networks outside the family are
based on strong norms of reciprocity. Thus, social networks rely on a transactional logic
characterised  by  the  exchange  of  a  gift  and then a  counter-gift,  sequentially.  These
imperatives translate, in practice, in that an individual who has a position in the public
sector has the duty to utilise that position for the benefit of his or her network and that
the economy of favours penetrates the public arena at the point of service provision in
the form of practices of bribing, gift-giving and favouritism. 
16 Significantly,  the  research  suggests  that  inclusion  criteria  for  entry  into  the  core
networks may be fluid and instrumentally constructed. This means that networks are
sometimes  expanded  in  a  deliberate  manner  to  link  up  individuals  increasingly  far
removed from each other on the basis of pragmatic considerations. As one Tanzanian
research participant remarked, ‘when you have a problem and you do not have people to
help you with it, then you go ahead and build the network to the person who can help
you’. Thus, we find that the size of the core networks varies considerably across the three
cases  and  this  variation  appears  to  be  related  to  state  effectiveness  in  terms  of
accessibility to essential public services and enforcement of the rule of law.
17 Thus, the research findings suggest that extensive social networks are more prevalent in
Uganda and Tanzania,  where formal rights and entitlements are seen as having little
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bearing on the actual provision of essential services such as healthcare and where there is
a perception that law enforcement is weak. Contrarily, core networks appear to be much
smaller in Rwanda, where the perception is that services are provided according to the
formal legal stipulations and that detection of corrupt actions is effective and followed by
sanction enforcement. 
18 In  the  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter  we  zoom into  the  practices  of  the  social
networks in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda through the analytical lens of three distinct
patterns of governance practices,  which we have previously identified (Baez-Camargo
and Ledeneva, 2017) and by means of which political, business and social networks pursue
their goals, whether these be to stay in power, maximise financial gains, access resources
and  services  or  simply  ‘get  things  done’.  In  this  chapter  we  discuss  these  informal
practices—which we have termed co-optation, control and camouflage—and argue that
they  are  associated  with  high levels  of  corruption because  they  ultimately  enact  an
informal redistribution of power and resources. 
19 - Co-optation is associated with recruitment or strategic appointments into public office of
allies and potential adversaries, who are granted impunity in exploiting the power and
resources  associated  with  public  office  in  exchange  for  mobilising  support  and
maintaining loyalty to the regime. 
20 - Control mechanisms are instrumental to the management of clashes of hidden interests,
to ensuring elite cohesion and to enforcing discipline among allies,  which is why the
unwritten  rules  of  co-optation  depend  on  the  existence  of  such  informal  control
practices. Common examples involve the selective enforcement of anti-corruption laws
against opponents or renegades, underscoring the validity of the saying attributed to
former Brazilian dictator Getulio Vargas: ‘For my friends everything, and for my enemies
the law’. 
21 -  Camouflage refers  to  the  manner  in  which the  realities  of  political  co-optation and
control  are  hidden  underneath  institutional  facades  and  policies  consistent  with  a
commitment to good governance and democratic accountability. Thus, punishment of a
detractor may be presented as evidence of the leaders’ commitment to anti-corruption. 
 
4. Co-optation
22 The first of the informal practices we have identified is co-optation, which is the means by
which recruitment into the network takes place. A key feature of co-optation is that it is
transactional;  it  involves establishing a relationship that is  based on strong bonds of
trust, reciprocity and loyalty, which enable and sustain a system of mutually beneficial
exchanges.  Thus,  a  gift,  an appointment,  a  bribe or a  favour are used to establish a
relationship, which generates indebtedness on the part of the accepting party and a gift
economy arises. The balance of indebtedness never gets settled; otherwise there would be
no relationship. Practices of co-optation happen in a top-down, horizontal, or bottom-up
fashion. 
23 Co-optation can occur in a top-down fashion, initiated by higher-level officials (e.g. at the
Ministry or District Council level) or mid-level service managers (for example, hospital
accountants) and targeting lower-level staff and service providers (for example, nurses
and  teachers). Top-down,  actors  engage  in  co-optation  in  order  to  promote  and
consolidate their own positions. They do so by rewarding supporters and by neutralising
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opposition  through  a  discretionary  allocation  of  opportunities  and  resources,  thus
nurturing and expanding the networks that ensure support. In turn, the beneficiaries can
typically extract rents in return for their unconditional support. Top-down co-optation
can extend to the grassroots level incorporating important social groups into the ruling
coalition, and is observed in the prevalence of patronage and clientelistic networks.
24 Practices of top-down co-optation in the public sector result in situations where service
providers are confronted with the demands of hierarchical networks in the workplace in
addition  to  their  formal  work  responsibilities  and  the  demands  and  expectations  of
family, friends and acquaintances. According to our research findings, vertical networks
can be found in the Tanzanian and Ugandan health sectors as the result of corruption in
the  recruiting  process.  Research  participants  from  both  countries  indicated  that
employment is often obtained through network connections where a relative, friend or
other social acquaintance of the appointing official recommends a particular individual
for a position. Under those circumstances, it is understood that the job giver is granting a
favour to the recipient, who thereafter enters the workplace with an unwritten, but well
understood, indebtedness vis-à-vis the sponsor. Corruption in recruitment also happens
when substantial sums are paid to secure a position. In such cases the debt is both a moral
one (for being considered for the position, for which the bribe is just the precondition) as
well as a real one (as invariably one will have to raise money with family and friends to
generate enough funds to pay for such a position).
25 In such contexts, where employment is obtained not by virtue of skills and professional
qualifications, but rather as a personalised transaction cemented by social connections
and/or money, loyalty tends to be much more valued than on the job performance when
it comes to being eligible for promotion or other benefits.  The research data further
suggests that vertical networks are conducive to collusive behaviours in which corrupt
service  providers  enjoy,  if  not  the  full  support  and  complicity,  at  least  passive
concealment on the part of their colleagues.
26 Co-optation can also be exercised horizontally when two or more networks engage in
practices  that  serve  the  mutual  benefit  of  all  those  involved.  Thus,  political  elites
frequently not only obtain the support of key non-state actors but also become recruited
into exercising public authority to inordinately favour particular interests. For example,
powerful business interests may be co-opted into supporting the interests of the political
elites (e.g. financing electoral campaigns), receiving in exchange substantial benefits (e.g.
large government contracts). Horizontal co-optation also happens when public officials
use  their  decision-making  authority  over  the  provision  of  services,  access  to
opportunities or distribution of resources instrumentally to grow their own networks. In
Uganda, head teachers or principals at prestigious schools have been known to informally
earmark some slots in the enrolment process in order to please higher ranking public
figures or wealthy families whose children would not otherwise be accepted on the basis
of their grades alone. Other accounts from Tanzania indicate that health staff may choose
to provide preferential treatment strategically to particular patients, say a teacher, with a
view to receiving a favour in return through help with a child’s enrolment in the future.
27 Bottom-up co-optation is  associated with informal  networks  at  the community level,
where  membership  of  particular  social  groups  binds  individuals  through  ties  of
reciprocity and moral obligation into supporting each other and pooling resources. Co-
optation practices at this level are associated with corruption because when a member
gets a position in public office then the network expects this person to extract rents for
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the benefit of the group. In Uganda and Tanzania, like in many other African countries, a
fair amount of social pressure is exerted on individuals who are formally employed or
somehow perceived to be relatively affluent, pushing them to acquire resources for the
benefit of their group—thereby legitimising certain corrupt acts and practices for the
sake of the community, family and kin. 
28 Social pressures may also be associated with more extortive modalities of bribing and
even embezzlement. This can happen when the opportunities for material redistribution
that a provider’s salary allows do not adequately meet the expectations of the networks.
This  was  vividly  narrated  in  an  interview  with  a  medical  doctor  in  Tanzania,  who
explained that the prevalent socially constructed preconception is that holding a medical
degree is associated with a high salary, which is drastically contradicted by the reality of
prevailing wages in the public health sector.
29 The research data from Tanzania and Uganda shows that social  networks tend to be
extensive and fluid. In this regard, exchanging favours is a key practice conducive to
expanding social connections, which works to both initiate and corroborate co-optation
into the network. ‘There is a reciprocal relationship, meaning today you have helped me,
tomorrow  I  must  find  a  way  to  return  the  favour’,  as  one  Tanzanian  Focus  Group
Discussion  participant  described  it.  Thus,  building  a  network  involves  evolving
relationships on the basis of a reciprocal exchange of favours, goods and resources. These
hinge on the mutually reinforcing conditions of indebtedness on the part of the recipient
of  the  favour  and  entitlement  on  the  part  of  the  giving  party.  These  practices  are
observed in the case of the delivery of public health services in that patients actively seek
to co-opt health workers into their networks based on the belief that otherwise it will not
be possible to obtain the medical treatment required. This is one reason why patients
often bring unsolicited gifts of different kinds to their appointments at the health facility
with the expectation that by doing so they can create a privileged relationship with the
provider.
30 In Uganda, service providers estimated that in about half of the interactions concerned
users offer unsolicited ‘gifts’ to providers. Tanzanian service providers mentioned that
they are used to receiving gifts from people in the form of material goods, such as maize,
rice, goats, beans or through a credit transfer via mobile phone. Due to the ambivalent
nature of the gift, one service provider stated that one has to try to figure out what the
gift means in the current context and if it would create an environment in which one is
suddenly indebted—when the motive of the gift was a form of co-optation—which raises
the question, as one participant asked: ‘How do you deal with such matters, when you
have already eaten the fish he bought?’ Further examples of the different types of co-
optation are described below (Table 4.1).
 
Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Cam...
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 10 | 2018
7
Table 4.1 Types of co-optation
Source: Compiled by Claudia Baez-Camargo.
31 The case of Rwanda provides both contrast to and confirmation of the practices described
above. According to evidence from our research, in Rwanda favouritism is the modality of
petty corruption that  is  still  most  prevalent  in the health sector,  where preferential
(faster)  treatment  is  given  to  family  and  friends  of  service  providers.  However,  the
instrumental use of gift-giving or bribing to build useful networks appears to be less
utilised in Rwanda. Whereas this certainly has to do with the potential risk of detection
and punishment that accompany such activities (discussed in the following section), an
important element to underscore is that the Rwandan regime, by significantly improving
the quality and accessibility of public services, has made the functionality of network
building for the most part redundant, in the sense that no informal strategy such as gift-
giving  or  appealing  to  social  connections  is  needed  in  order  to  receive  adequate
treatment. 
32 The generalised experiences among Rwandan research participants indicate that for the
most part service provision is delivered as stipulated by formal rules and entitlements7. In
other words, one of the drivers for the growth and and nourishment of social networks
identified in Tanzania and Uganda—that is, overcoming the challenges associated with
the  poor  quality  and  accessibility  of  essential  services—is  mitigated  in  Rwanda  with
improved public services.
 
5. Control
33 The second pattern of  informality is  control,  which relates to how informal networks
enforce discipline among their  members.  This  can happen by means of  the selective
enforcement of formal rules (e.g. anti-corruption laws) or informally (e.g. by means of
veiled threats or exclusion from the network). Interestingly, informal control also occurs
bottom-up, whereby powerful actors are locked into the system and expected to tend to
the  demands  and  expectations  of  their  networks,  otherwise  risking  negative
consequences ranging from social shaming to even violence. 
34 There are several kinds of sanctions that can be expected if one does not adhere to the
norms  of  the  networks.  Practices  of  control  among  hierarchical  networks  in  the
workplace were illustrated by two Ugandan rural health workers, according to whom
people  not  only  become corrupt  to  get  better  positions,  but  also  because  those  not
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participating in the prescribed corruption schemes or those who denounce incidences of
corruption may face serious repercussions. As one health worker experienced: ‘If  you
refuse,  you miss the job [opportunity] or your name will  not appear on the payroll.’
Therefore, fear over losing one’s job or being bullied can translate into a ‘don’t ask, don’t
tell’ policy, as explained by a nurse who had witnessed incidences of corruption involving
fellow health workers: ‘Although you know what is happening, you stay quiet because it’s
beyond your understanding.’
35 As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of social networks is related to the manner in
which  they  embody  deeply  ingrained  values  of  reciprocity,  solidarity  and  moral
obligation towards one’s group. Based on these values, certain behaviours are expected.
Concretely, when it comes to the family, the entitlement to partake of the gains of one’s
next of kin is an essential, unquestionable premise of social life in the three countries.
Consequently, one of the worst transgressions occurs when an individual is seen to turn
his or her back on a family member. This can result in social isolation and shaming,
although in some contexts the consequences might be more extreme as explained by a
service user in Kampala: ‘If my brother earns 15 million and I ask him to help me pay
twenty thousand shillings for my son to register for exams and he tells me about his cow,
which is sick, and that he needs 100,000 for it to get treated yet he can’t help me with
only twenty thousand shillings, then what do I need from him apart from beating him to
death?’
36 Outside the family, social networks rely on an expectation of reciprocity in the ongoing
exchange  of  favours  and gifts.  Service  providers  recounted  the  difficulties  they  face
rejecting unsolicited gifts from users; because the act of presenting and receiving a gift is
socioculturally anchored, rejecting a gift can be interpreted as disrespectful.
37 The significance of the control that can be exercised by social networks is underscored by
the notable extent to which fulfilling one’s duties and obligations vis-à-vis the network is
closely linked to social status. In the FGDs participants were asked about the actions that
gain individuals respect and good social standing in their communities versus those that
cause a person shame and to fall into disgrace. Some of the FGD responses to this question
are summarised below (Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2 Actions conducive to gaining and losing status
Source: Compiled by Claudia Baez-Camargo.
38 In Tanzania and Uganda, the expectation of help and a contribution to the network’s
welfare described above influences the behaviours of service providers profoundly. For
example, if a service provider does not favour a relative in service provision or rejects a
small bribe or a gift, the perception among research participants was that this person’s
adherence to formal rules destroys his or her trust-based relationships, and such a person
might  be  ultimately  abandoned  by  the  community.  The  infringement  of  socially
embedded norms is therefore seen as affecting the moral economy of the community,
because  it  threatens  the  socially  constituted  values  and  practices  of  economic
redistribution that are critical to meeting essential needs.
39 The responses from Rwanda are particularly interesting as they suggest  the tensions
generated by a context in which there are strict constraints in place inhibiting service
providers from engaging in those practices that are nonetheless still  regarded as the
gateway  to  social  status  and  respect.  Rwandan  service  providers  can  therefore be
characterised  as  being  subject  to  bottom-up  control  in  a  similar  manner  as  their
Tanzanian and Ugandan counterparts,  as  attested by the following statement from a
Rwandan health worker: ‘Actually, when you refuse to render the service, people you are
associated with will say that “having him is like not having someone”. The effect of this is
that the worker is put aside and is looked upon as a bad person, even losing friends or the
appreciation of their extended family.’
40 However, social pressures exist in significant tension with formal control mechanisms in
Rwanda, which because of its enforcement of a zero-tolerance approach to corruption has
distinguished itself significantly from Tanzania (at least until recently) and Uganda. In
Rwanda,  instances  of  petty  corruption  involving  bribing  or  favouritism  are  harshly
sanctioned, including by means of a policy of naming and shaming whereby individuals
guilty of corruption are publicly identified in published lists that not only bear their
names but also those of their parents and community. Our research indeed suggests that,
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because the sanctions against cases of corruption are widely perceived to be extremely
harsh and effectively enforced, compliance is commonly associated with fear with regard
to the possible reporting of negative performance or to legal repercussions. 
41 Our research also shed light on creative solutions by means of which health workers in
Rwanda negotiate the tensions that exist between the formal and the informal norms
they  must  abide  by.  In  particular,  health  workers  gave  account  of  receiving  family
members for treatment outside the opening hours of the health facility to avoid openly
disrupting  the  first  come,  first  served  rules  of  service  provision.  Rwandan  FGD
participants  also  expressed  that  bribery  still  can  occur  but  requires  intricate
arrangements to avoid disclosure and may only be arranged with people who are well
known and trusted by the service  provider  for  fear  of  being denounced to  the  law-
enforcement authorities.
42 For those reasons, Rwandan health providers concluded that corruption has increasingly
become a  private  affair,  meaning that  it  is  restricted to  the  innermost  circle  of  the
informal network, due to the harsh costs associated with detection and the risk of being
shamed extending to the whole family. Consequently, the strong enforcement of anti-
corruption laws in Rwanda appears to be resulting in a situation where core networks are
shrinking.
43 Interestingly, the research findings from Tanzania suggest how the incentives of service
providers are being reshaped with increased enforcement of sanctions against corrupt
behaviours  under  the  current  regime.  As  in  Rwanda,  this  exacerbates  the  tensions
between the demands of the formal and informal normative frameworks to which the
service providers are expected to respond. One participant in the service providers’ FGD
explained that they ‘only employ you as an individual and not as a family. However, they
[the family] do not understand such a thing […] they do not know the regulations the
employed have to follow’.
44 Thus,  the  perception  that  anti-corruption  enforcement  is  tightening  means  that  the
opportunity space to engage in practices of petty corruption is shrinking. Interestingly,
service providers are now developing a new language to convey the situation. According
to anecdotal evidence, public officials who cannot grant a favour or provide the amounts
expected by their networks resort to simply stating ‘Magufuli’ to communicate the idea
that under the current president things have changed.
 
6. Camouflage
45 The third informal pattern is camouflage, which refers to how informal practices of co-
optation and control take place beneath a facade of commitment to formal procedures,
such  as  the  rule  of  law,  anti-corruption  measures  or  democratic  accountability.
Camouflage also takes place under the guise of respecting ‘traditional values’. Practices of
camouflage protect the network from external scrutiny by external actors and play on
the coexistence of multiple normative frameworks (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Blundo et al.,
2006). 
46 Thus, informality becomes difficult to grasp to an outsider precisely because it makes use
of the formal order (whether based on legal or traditional norms) in order to pursue
hidden agendas. For example, camouflage is routinely used by corrupt political regimes to
create  a  smooth  facade  that  legitimates  them  not  only  vis-à-vis  donors  and  the
Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Cam...
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 10 | 2018
11
international community but also with domestic audiences. Seemingly upholding certain
pledges with regard, for example, to elections or legal reform, de facto the reforms are
undertaken to facilitate relations with external actors, often succeeding in hiding ‘real’
processes, practices and power from closer scrutiny. 
47 Whereas camouflage is  normally seen to be a practice exercised from the top down,
evidence suggests that it might also be practiced from the bottom up. For instance, lowly
public officials may use ‘correct’  (i.e.  formalised) procedures to hide malfeasance and
extraction from the law enforcement authorities or citizens may convey bribing as an
expression of the gift-giving customs cherished by society.
48 In our research data one of the most conspicuous forms of camouflage relates to the
ambivalent nature of gift-giving. FGD participants elaborated on how although a gift can
be offered simply as a gift, the expectation of a counter-gift—in the form of a service or a
favour—is  inherent,  understood  by  all  parties  involved  although  it  may  never  be
explicitly articulated. Thus the act of gift-giving is intrinsically ambivalent and a bribe
can always be disguised as  a  gift.  Rwandan FGD participants  explained that  a  gift  is
perceived  as  part  of  the  social  routine,  an  inherent  social  practice,  and  as  such  is
described as  a  public  rather  than  a  private  transaction.  A  bribe,  in  contrast,  is  an
essentially  private  transaction.  Therefore,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  if  the  bribe
becomes  exposed  (taken  out  from  the  private  into  the  public  realm),  it  should
immediately morph into a gift.
49 Kampala health facility staff agreed that there is nothing wrong with giving preferential
treatment to family members—‘Your relative must be given priority; if there is not an
emergency,  my mother,  father,  son or  daughter  come first’—because this  is  the way
things should proceed ‘according to culture’. In this context the same health staff gave
other examples of practices of camouflage that make use of social norms to cover up
illicit activities. Some research participants recounted how support staff at the health
facility often ask them to treat their family members, when in reality they are soliciting
bribes  from  health  facility  users  in  order  to  pose  as  a  relative  and  thus  get  them
expedited treatment. There were stories told of support staff that sometimes requested
speedy treatment for up to five sick relatives in one day. This practice is referred to as
‘clan soccer’, and according to the FGD participants it takes advantage of the fluid manner
in which the terms ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ are used in Uganda.
50 Camouflage is also proactively used in other ways in order to get access to a network.
Participants  of  FGDs  in  Tanzania  and Uganda described how service  providers  often
assess the situation to determine whether it is worth co-opting the service seeker into
their  network.  Thus,  service  seekers  recount  how they  prepare  before  going  to  the
facility; strategies include dressing up in order to give the impression that they have
resources that will make them attractive, or—conversely—dressing down and bringing
small children along to encourage feelings of compassion on the part of the provider. On
their part, FGD participants from Rwanda acknowledged that in order to get away with
bribing one needs to carefully plan in order to mask the bribe as a gift, or make sure the
exchange never happens directly but rather through a mutual and trusted acquaintance,
because one cannot even try to engage in any remotely suspicious activity with strangers
out of fear of being denounced. 
51 An interesting example of camouflage among public officials in Rwanda occurs when they
resort to a practice known as ‘techniquer’. In Rwanda, to ‘techniquer’ a report (‘gutekinika
Raporo’) or statistics mean to falsify or present false reports or figures to one’s superiors
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(Beaz Camargo and Gatwa, 2018). In a first instance, resorting to ‘techniquer’ may be used
to  hide  corruption  favouring  individuals  or  percolating  up  (or  down)  the  network.
However, that may not be the only use of this practice as Beaz Camargo and Gatwa (2018)
found that public officials may also use such practices pre-emptively when they have not
been  successful  in  meeting  their  professional performance  targets  and  fear  tough
sanctions from above. Therefore, what is particularly interesting in the case of Rwanda is
that these practices are not condoned by or led from the top, as is the case in the other
East African countries. Rather, camouflage is used to hide such practices from the top
leadership. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks
52 In this chapter, we have sought to outline the patterns shaping social networks in three
East  African  countries.  Evidence  from  two  related  research  projects  shows  that
governance processes are informed by the norms and practices through which social
networks are configured. The findings confirm that there are certain patterns that can be
identified, each with a distinct set of practices and norms. Co-optation, camouflage, and
control  are all  practised both to secure the moral  economy from which the network
draws its legitimacy and to enable the extraction of concrete material gains for individual
members.  These  practices  are  ‘star-shaped’,  so  to  speak,  in  that  they  radiate  in  all
directions: bottom-up, horizontally, as well as top-down. The distinction between ‘formal’
and ‘informal’ governance becomes obsolete, as these practices draw on a diverse and
contingent  range  of  norms.  Whereas  certain  practices  may be  more  iterative  and
habitual, others emerge from calculated judgements of particular situations and contexts.
53 Some  of  the  most  interesting  findings  are  emerging  from  ‘liminal’  contexts,  where
established patterns of locking into and reproducing networks are breaking down and
new ones remain in the making. Such open-ended transformations are likely present in
all  countries,  even  though  in  some  contexts  they  may  be  happening  within  more
circumscribed spaces than in others. Our findings suggest that these transformations are
the result of changes of political regimes—particularly in the case of Rwanda under Paul
Kagame, where social networks have had to reconfigure and react to top-down sanctions
against corruption in the public sector. Whereas in Tanzania and Uganda the networks
are more fluid and are built instrumentally, in Rwanda there seems to be a trend whereby
people  are  trimming  rather  than  expanding  their  networks  as  formal  rules  and
procedures are being vigorously enforced by the regime.  Thus,  while health workers
continue to be subject to their networks’ expectations of preferential treatment, these are
increasingly restricted to encompass only family and close friends.
54 Tanzania  is  also  an  important  case  to  follow  up  on  given  that  similar  top-down
approaches to anti-corruption are being favoured by the government of John Magufuli,
the  president—for  example—using  personal  discretion  and  presidential  authority  to
short-circuit  ‘official’  procedures,  albeit  to  sanction corrupt  senior  officials.  In  these
cases, although at first glance it may seem as if the regime is imposing ‘official’ norms,
the  picture  on  the  ground is  somewhat  messier.  Although our  findings  may  not  be
sufficient  to  make  a  strong  argument,  it  seems  as  if  new  forms  of  camouflage  are
emerging that are not top-down (as in the case of Uganda, for instance), but bottom-up.
This could also be observed in Rwanda, where camouflage practices are being used to hide
both inefficiencies and failures to achieve the centrally determined performance targets
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from the feared eye of the government. This raises important questions as to shifts in
informal patterns: whether a unilinear move from greater trust in informality networks
to  formal  rules  and  institutions  is  really  underway  in  Rwanda,  or  whether  the
transformation process is more complicated, with new and different forms of informal
practices emerging—one being new practices of camouflage. Our findings also highlight
some significant side effects of enforcing anti-corruption measures in a strictly top-down
manner,  whereby social  networks based on values of solidarity and reciprocity break
down, the wider consequences of which in the long run are not yet clear. 
55 From a political economy perspective, it is conventionally argued that the eradication of
corruption hinges not merely on institutional reform, but on the political will to change
norms  and  practices.  However,  our  findings  suggest  a  far  more  contextualised  and
complicated  relationship.  Firstly,  leadership  indeed  matters.  Ugandans  refer  to  the
scandalous  behaviour  of  political  leaders  to  justify  their  own  acts  of  corruption.  In
Tanzania, on the other hand, Magufuli sacked his close associates, even some who were
known to be close friends of his. Shared images and ideas about social roles—including
what constitutes being a ‘good’ politician, service provider and public official—influence
how people  come to  expect  themselves  and others  to  behave  in  different  situations
(Kotzian, 2011). However, the evidence from our research projects suggests very strongly
that leaders, even those at the very top, are not as autonomous and powerful as they are
sometimes portrayed in the literature. Our focus on social networks carves out the many
ways in which they are locked into configurations from which they cannot easily or
readily break away. All members of a network, including powerful actors, are tied into
relations of reciprocal exchange through co-optation and control. These practices are all
the stronger as they are frequently underpinned by social norms and values that are used
to legitimise extraction and redistribution (Olivier de Sardan, 1999). 
56 Furthermore, as indicated above, even in the cases where to all intents and purposes the
strong political will of a president exists to enforce official norms and procedures, the
effects on the actual patterns of governance are empirical questions. Whether and where
new forms of ‘gaming the system’ emerge, or indeed a Weberian public ethos is nurtured,
is subject to specific contexts and networks. These effects are highly contingent upon the
structuring of the society in question, the patterns of the networks and the practices of
governance (Koechlin 2013). These need to be understood in more detail if we are to shed
light on the transformations effected by political will. In what way urbanisation and the
transformation of urban spaces affect such processes is a further pertinent topic of future
research. 
57 What  do  our  findings  imply  for  anti-corruption policies?  We join  the  large  choir  of
scholars and practitioners who call for more nuanced and evidence-based approaches to
the  anti-corruption  field.  Although  our  findings  are  still  emerging,  there are  some
pointers that can be drawn from the two research projects. 
58 Social norms and values matter—and they can and do change. The patterning of networks is
not  just  imposed by structures  or  by calculated self-interest;  our findings show how
actors orient themselves and their practices explicitly (i.e. not merely habitually) along
particular norms and values, and seek to create moral coherence by drawing on specific
norms and values when legitimising or underpinning their practices.  ‘Being part of a
family’, ‘being one of us’ or ‘looking after each other’ are frequent expressions that are
employed by actors when they explain why and how they interact within social networks.
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In this sense, they are evidently also used to legitimise ‘corrupt’ practices, by drawing on
alternative normative repertoires that emphasise reciprocity or social obligations. 
59 However, it is absolutely central to underline that these norms and values themselves are
contingent upon context. Of course all actors draw on multiple repertoires that speak to
different normative frameworks—we speak and act differently depending on the role we
are playing and the situation we are in. But more pertinently for anti-corruption policies,
the key point emerging from our research is that societal norms and values can and do
change in interaction with changes in the political and economic environment. 
60 Our research findings underline that these changes need to be understood far better than
has been the case to date. In Rwanda, for instance, such change is being effected by the
regime, and enforced rigorously throughout the state and society. The effects may not be
as coherent and consistent as some authors portray them—that is to say, as marching
towards  a  rule-and-procedure-based  state.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  actors  are
evaluating their practices in the light of these changes and that certain norms and values
may indeed be changing fundamentally, the ultimate outcome of which remains to be
seen. Also, the jury is still out with regard to the current situation in Tanzania; the effects
of  Magufuli’s  very  top-down  and  personal  anti-corruption  battle  are  yet  to  be  fully
ascertained.  One  interesting  insight  is  that,  much  like  in  Rwanda,  new  practices  of
camouflage seem to be emerging bottom-up. 
61 To conclude, the three governance patterns identified in this chapter—namely, control,
co-optation, and camouflage, all play with the ambivalence of ‘formal’ or ‘official’ norms,
on the one hand, and ‘informal’ or ‘traditional’ norms, on the other, depending on the
context  and the  most  promising strategy for  the  intended purpose.  In  practice  they
cannot be separated, but are part and parcel of a range of repertoires at the disposal of
the actors to address specific problems and pursue specific interests. At the same time,
our findings underline that ingrained expectations and social  sanctions can lead to a
situation  in  which  actors  are  ‘locked’  into  particular  patterns.  However,  governance
patterns are changing all the time, sometimes as a result of changing political regimes.
The many ambivalences characterising these patterns and their dynamics may represent
potential entry points to promoting positive behavioural changes and advancing anti-
corruption agendas if understood in-depth and by working closely with the social actors
concerned. 
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NOTES
1. Empirical evidence presented in this paper stems from the findings from two research projects
of  the  Basel  Institute’s  Public  Governance  Division.  The  first  project,  entitled  ‘Informal
Governance  and  Corruption  -  Transcending  the  Principal-Agent  and  Collective  Action
Paradigms’,  is  funded by the joint  UK Department for International  Development (DFID)  and
British Academy Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) programme. For more information about the
ACE  programme  and  the  project  please  visit  http://www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption and
http://www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660.  The  second project  is  entitled  ‘Corruption,  Social  Norms
and Behaviours in East Africa’ and is funded by the East Africa Research Fund (EARF) of DFID. For
more information about EARF and the project please visit http://www.earesearchfund.org/ and
http://www.earesearchfund.org/research-corruption-social-norms-and-behaviors-east-africa
(accessed on 2 May 2018)
2. For a discussion of a non-normative, inductive approach to governance see Blundo and Le
Meur (2008), Bevir (2013) or Koechlin (2015). 
3. The projects  used qualitative data collection methods with the support  of  a  team of local
researchers. The data presented in this paper was collected during research activities conducted
between January 2016 and August 2017, activities that involved focus group discussions (FGDs) at
two sites (one urban and one rural area) in each country. In the FGDs we used the health sector as
an indicative entry point to study the interface where corruption risks arise. The participant
profiles of the focus groups were a) community members, b) providers of health services, and c)
managers of health facilities. A total of 18 FGDs were conducted. The local researchers are Prof.
Tharcisse Gatwa and Mr Abel Dufitumukiza of the Protestant University of Rwanda, Dr Richard
Sambaiga and Mr Egidius Kamanyi of the University of Dar es Salaam, Prof. Paul Bukuluki of
Makerere University and Mr Robert Lugolobi, independent anti-corruption consultant in Uganda.
4. The concept of social networks is sociologically highly loaded—for a critique of social network
analysis see (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994); for the seminal contribution to the actor–network
approach see (Latour, 2005). Here, the significance of social networks as a frame of reference
emerged inductively from the data,  and still  needs to be theorised adequately,  although our
interpretations are closer to the constructivist approach of actor–network theory. 
5. See Olivier de Sardan (2008), who coined the expression ‘real’ governance. 
6. A citizens’ assessment and expectations survey published in September 2016 reported that ‘96
per cent of Tanzanians approve or strongly approve of President Magufuli’s performance since
taking office’  (Twaweza East Africa,  2016).  Numerous local and international media have also
reported  on  the  popularity  of  President  Magufuli.  See  for  example  the  BBC’s  profile  of  the
president (Nesoba, 2015) and the New African’s analysis of ‘John Magufuli: Tanzania’s rising star’
(New African Magazine, 2017).
7. These rules emanate from Ubudehe, a home-grown solution and poverty-reduction initiative
and  one  of  the  country’s  core  development  programmes.  Ubudehe involves  a  system  of
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categorisation  of  all  households  according  to  income level,  which  forms  the  basis  on  which
entitlements are determined and subsidies allocated.
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corruption and its underpinnings. Findings from our comparative research in three East African
countries (Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) suggest that these informal practices are relevant to
an understanding of the choices and attitudes of providers and users of public services at the
local level. Adopting this analytical lens helps to explain the limited impact of conventional anti-
corruption prescriptions and provides a basis to develop alternative strategies that harness the
potential of social network dynamics to promote positive anti-corruption outcomes.
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